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Abstract 
 
In this paper we address two main issues: the computation of default probability implicit 
in emerging markets bond prices and the impact on portfolio risks and returns of 
expected changes in default probability. Using a reduced-form model, weekly estimates 
of default probabilities for U.S. Dollar denominated Global bonds of twelve emerging 
markets are extrapolated for the sample period 1997-2001. The estimation of a logit type 
econometric model shows that weekly changes of the default probabilities can be 
explained by means of some capital markets factors. Recursively estimating the logit 
model using rolling windows of data, out-of-sample forecasts for the dynamics of 
default probabilities are generated and used to form portfolios of bonds. The practical 
application provides interesting results, both in terms of testing the ability of a naive 
trading strategy based on model forecasts to outperform a “customized benchmark”, and 
in terms of the model ability to actively manage the portfolio risk (evaluated in terms of 
VaR) with respect to a constant proportion allocation. 
 
JEL Classification: G12, G15, F34, G11 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, emerging markets have experienced a number of financial crises. 
Recent cases include the Asian turmoil of 1997, the 1998 Russian default and, more 
recently, the downgrade of Turkish bonds and the crisis of Argentina, culminating in its 
January 2002 default. All these events have given rise to significant contagion effects 
among emerging markets. 
Much of the research on emerging markets applies to equities, whereas relatively few 
empirical contributions on bonds have been provided (for a comprehensive review, see 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002, 2003)). This could be explained by the difficulty in creating 
reliable and deep data sets of bond prices, interest rates, exchange rates and 
macroeconomic fundamentals to be used as numerical inputs for market analysis. 
Moreover, the outbreak of the interest versus emerging market bonds is recent, as it 
started in the early Nineties, when the sharp decrease of interest rates in developed 
countries forced investors to look for high yield bonds other than government bonds and 
when emerging countries began issuing larger and larger amounts of debt via new more 
liquid instruments, such as Brady bonds, Global bonds and Eurobonds. 
Estimating the default probability implicit in emerging market bond prices has become 
extremely important for institutional investors (banks, mutual and pension funds, in 
particular), given the relatively high weight of these securities in their portfolios. 
However, the high returns offered by this type of bonds are mainly explained by credit 
risk considerations due either to default events (issuer does not pay interest or principal 
or both) or market losses caused by frequent downgrading and subsequent bond price 
volatility. 
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Knowing the degree of confidence that financial markets are currently using to discount 
a bond issuer’s default is, therefore, at a practical level, extremely important under at 
least two different aspects. The first one consists in the computation of the risk the 
investor is undertaking over a given horizon. The second one regards the impact on 
portfolio risks and returns of different default probability expectations. In this paper we 
address both of these issues. 
First, we extrapolate weekly estimates of default probabilities from a reduced-form 
model. The empirical work is based on U.S. Dollar denominated Global bonds of twelve 
emerging markets from February 1997 to July 2001. 
Then, we show that default probabilities can be predicted by some capital markets 
factors (essentially interest rates, exchange rates and credit spreads) and use them as 
explanatory variables in logit type models for the prediction of the probability of a 
market increase/decrease in bond prices. 
In the final part of the paper, we recursively estimate a logit model to produce out-of-
sample forecasts for the probability of observing future appreciation/depreciation of the 
bonds. The practical application of the impact on portfolio returns of different default 
probability expectations provides interesting results, both in terms of testing the ability 
of a naive trading strategy based on model forecasts to outperform a “customized 
benchmark”, and in terms of the model’s capability to actively manage the portfolio risk 
(evaluated in terms of VaR) with respect to a constant proportion allocation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main features of emerging 
markets bonds. Section 3 illustrates the reduced-form valuation model used for the 
pricing of Global bonds. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical work and 
section 5 shows the underlying default probabilities extrapolated by the estimation of 
the model. Section 6 provides empirical evidence on predicting the dynamics of default 
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probabilities and on the performance, in terms of returns and VaR measures, of 
emerging markets bond portfolios built on such forecasts. Finally, section 7 contains 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Emerging market bonds 
In March 1989, the U.S. Government proposed a new debt initiative, the Brady Plan, 
which recognized that a full repayment of the debt for developing countries was no 
longer a reasonable goal. The Plan put pressure on commercial and investment banks to 
concede and to manage some form of debt and debt-service relief and also called for an 
increase in secondary market activity, in order to grant liquidity to these issues. The 
implementation of the Plan led to the birth of a new kind of emerging market (high 
yields) bonds: the Brady bonds. 
So far, several countries have taken advantage of the program by issuing different types 
of Brady bonds. The Brady Program helped and accelerated the issue of other kinds of 
emerging markets bonds, by that way contributing to the development of the emerging 
debt market. At present, the majority of debt is from Latin America, with Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela covering about 70% - 80% of the outstanding market. 
Nowadays the emerging markets bond market is capturing the interest of both individual 
and institutional investors because of its uniqueness in at least two respects: first, yields 
are extremely high, and, second, some issues are very large and liquid (which was one 
of Brady’s main aims). Moreover, these features support an active over-the-counter 
derivatives market, so that investors can take views on country risk, bond spreads or 
volatility, as well as hedging their own portfolios through the use of customized options 
and/or futures. 
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As widely known, at present, developing countries issue several types of bonds in 
different markets. Usually, we distinguish between locally traded bonds (Government, 
Agencies, and Corporate securities quite illiquid, except for some issues, traded 
exclusively in the local bond markets and rarely present in institutional investors’ 
portfolios), Brady bonds and Eurobonds (otherwise known as Sovereign bonds). 
Among Eurobonds, the most liquid (and therefore reliable for our analysis) type of 
bonds issued by developing countries are the so called Global bonds, usually long-term, 
plain vanilla, uncollateralized bonds, whose cash flows are easily computed and 
discounted at each point in time, the only need being the term structure of risk-free 
interest rates and coupon payment dates. 
Market prices of Brady discount bonds have been used in the empirical investigation of 
Claessens and Pennacchi (1996), Izvorski (1998) and Pages (2001), whereas Eurobonds 
have been used by Merrick (2001) and Duffie, Pedersen and Singleton (2003). 
In this paper, we prefer to use Global bonds to extrapolate default probabilities because 
of the following reasons: (i) the simplicity of the calculations involved by using simple 
plain vanilla bonds in comparison to the higher level of difficulty arising when dealing 
with some complicated structures as in the case of Bradies; (ii) the fact that they usually 
have a 20-30 year maturity horizon and, therefore, their pricing reflects the mid to long 
term assessment of the sustainability of one country debt profile; (iii) no assumptions on 
future term structures, future commodity prices or macroeconomic fundamentals are 
required, contrary to the case of some types of Bradies (for example, the future coupons 
of some issues of Mexican Bradies are linked to the price of Mexican oil and this 
introduces discretionary elements in the evaluation of the implied default probability); 
(iv) the implied default probability measure is “pure”, as Global bonds are usually 
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uncollateralized, different from the Bradies for which collateral guarantees (generally 
cash deposits retained by the Federal Reserve system) are requested. 
 
3. The pricing model 
Several models for the pricing of defaultable bonds have been proposed in the literature. 
Usually, three main approaches are distinguished (for a recent comprehensive review, 
see Duffie and Singleton (2003)): 
i) Merton’s (1974) option pricing based model, which computes the payoff at maturity 
as the face value of the defaultable bond minus the value of a put option on the issuer's 
value with an exercise price equal to the face value of the bond. 
ii) Structural models, which relax one of the unrealistic assumptions of Merton’s model, 
that is that default occurs only at maturity of the debt, when the issuer’s assets are no 
longer sufficient to face its obligations towards bondholders. On the contrary, these 
models assume that default may occur at any time between issuance and maturity of the 
debt and that default is triggered when the issuer’s assets reach a lower threshold level 
(see, for example, Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)). 
iii) Reduced-form models, which do not condition default explicitly on issuer’s value, 
and therefore are, in general, easier to implement. They also differ from typical 
structural models in the degree of predictability of default, as they can easily 
accommodate defaults coming as sudden surprises (see, for example, Jarrow, Lando and 
Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999)). 
The reduced-form approach appears to be particularly suitable for the pricing of 
emerging market bonds, as it relies only on market data. Recent examples include 
Merrick (2001), Pages (2001) and Duffie, Pedersen and Singleton (2003). 
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There exists also a large economic literature modelling sovereign debt as a function of 
reputation costs and sanctions, in that the decision to default of a country depends on the 
cost of future access to credit markets and the threat of economic and political 
retaliations (see, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 
and Gibson and Sundaresan (2001)). 
Our pricing model can be viewed as an application of the discrete-time version of a 
reduced-form model. In fact, the model considers the discrete-time process generating 
the market price of bonds and uses that price and the term structure of interest rates as 
the only available sources of information to extract the default probability through the 
use of a closed formula. 
The model works as follows. Assuming no arbitrage conditions, the market price of a 
defaultable asset should be a function of the default probability term structure, as well as 
of the future cash flows discounted using the current risk-free term structure. 
Interpreting the coupon bond as a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds, we get the following 
expression for the market price of a defaultable bond: 
    ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
⋅δ+−⋅⋅−⋅=
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1exp     (1) 
where ti indicates the time to i-th maturity, itc  the i-th cash flow, itr  the risk-free interest 
rate for the i-th maturity, 
it
p  the risk-neutral probability that default occurs before ti and 
δ the recovery ratio. 
As in Izvorski (1998), we assume that 
it
p  is a properly defined function of a constant 
semi-annual risk neutral default probability (p, constant for all maturities) which 
changes only for the effect of changes in the term structure of risk-free interest rates, or 
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for the effect of macroeconomic and/or political events that investors discount through 
prices. 
Following Duffee (1999), we also assume that, once a country defaults on some issues, 
just a fraction (the recovery ratio) of both coupon and principal will be paid for by the 
issuer in all the subsequent payments. This is a restrictive hypothesis, which does not 
allow us to account for the possibility that economic conditions could improve in the 
future and, therefore, the country repayment capacity be re-established. However, in our 
opinion, this drawback is a very marginal one. In fact, under the hypothesis that a 
default occurs prior to maturity, after the moratorium period, a new bond could be 
issued for an amount equivalent to the recovery ratio and for a maturity corresponding to 
the old one. 
A third assumption concerns the recovery ratio, which we assume to be known and 
constant. Some more sophisticated models infer it from the historical recovery rates 
(those observed during past defaults) for identically rated issuers, some others describe 
the recovery ratio by means of a random variable. We believe that this is not a drastic 
drawback, since one can also extrapolate default probabilities conditionally on different 
measures of recovery ratio. 
Given these assumptions, the following equilibrium relationship between the market 
price of a defaultable bond and its expected cash flows can be derived: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
−−δ+−⋅⋅−⋅=
N
i
ii
ittt pptrcV ii
1
)1(11exp     (2) 
where it pp i )1(1 −−= . 
Given the term structure of risk-free interest rates, the bond price and the recovery rate, 
the equation above can be solved with respect to the risk-neutral probability of default p. 
In our application, all computations are carried out conditionally on the recovery rate 
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parameter δ. In evaluating the bonds, we adopt a conservative hypothesis and fix it equal 
to 20%, based on bond managers’ experience 1. 
From equation (2) it is straightforward to recover, for each emerging market, the 
defaultable term structure: 
     ( ) ( )[ ]ii
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tt ppt
ry
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)1(11ln1 −−δ+−−=     (3) 
where 
it
y  is the credit-risky interest rate for the i-th maturity. 
 
4. The data 
In the empirical work, we consider long-term (usually 10 to 30 years to maturity at the 
time of issuance) U.S. Dollar denominated Global bonds of twelve emerging markets, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, Venezuela, Panama, South 
Africa, Turkey, China, Philippines and South Korea. The sample contains weekly 
market values of Global bond prices (mean of bid and ask quotes), ranging from 14 
February 1997 to 27 July 2001 2. The main features of these issues are reported in table 
1. For each country we choose the most liquid long-term bond, which involves relatively 
small bid-ask spreads. In fact, we can observe that bid-ask spreads, expressed as a 
percentage of the ask quotation, are around 1% for all countries, with the only exception 
of Colombia. 
As we consider only U.S. Dollar denominated emerging markets Global bonds, USD 
Libor and swap rates are used to fit the risk-free term structure. As for the Libor rates, 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Xu and Nencioni (2000) on J.P.Morgan practice. We point out in 
the empirical part of the paper that a change in the recovery rate assumed in the 
calculation of the default probabilities implies a parallel shift in the estimated 
probability of default. 
 10
we use all maturities between 1 month and 12 months, whereas for the swap rates we 
include all maturities between 2 and 10 years and the 15, 20 and 30 years maturities. 
The risk-free term structure of interest rates is obtained by fitting a cubic spline to these 
data. 
 
5. Extracting default probabilities 
The implied risk-neutral default probabilities are estimated by minimizing the difference 
between observed and theoretical prices in equation (2) above. Table 2 contains some 
summary statistics on the estimated default probabilities 3, whereas figure 1 shows the 
time series estimates for the countries considered in the sample along with the 
corresponding credit spreads, calculated as the difference between the yield on the 
emerging market bonds and the yield on a U.S. Treasury bond with same maturity. 
As expected, the dynamics of the estimated risk-neutral probabilities reflect the 
evolution of both the political and macroeconomic situations of the different countries 
over the 1997-2001 period including deep financial and economic crisis, such as the 
Asian financial turmoil (1997), Russia’s default (1998), the Turkish and Argentina’s 
crises (2001). 
In the first part of the sample, the implied default probabilities are relatively low and 
stable. However, disruptions in the balance of payments, disequilibria in the gross 
domestic product growth, stock exchange bubbles and extra-ordinary overvalued real 
                                                                                                                                               
2
 The source of the data is Thompson Financial (formerly Datastream Ltd.). 
3
 In the presence of risk premiums, risk-neutral default probabilities would be larger 
than actual default probabilities. However, assuming that risk premia do not change 
significantly over time, the dynamics of actual probabilities should map into that of the 
risk-neutral ones. 
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effective exchange rates in several less developed countries culminate in the outbreak of 
the Asian financial crisis from mid 1997 onward. 
As a result, investors all over the world re-evaluate the risk implied in keeping emerging 
market securities in their portfolios. This leads to a diffused panic reaction in late 1997, 
when the world’s financial markets witnessed a panic selling of emerging market bonds 
and stocks in favour of safer assets in developed countries (flight-to-quality effect). 
During this period, the estimated default probabilities for all the countries in the sample 
increase, even if not too dramatically according to our estimates. Argentina’s implied 
risk-neutral probability of default grows from a semi-annual 2% to almost 4%; Brazil’s, 
Mexico’s and Venezuela’s default probabilities increase, respectively, by 3%, 1% and 
2.4%, while a less dramatic impact of the mentioned crisis is seen in Ecuador 4 and 
Colombia. 
After this critical period, another period of relative calm precedes the outbreak of a more 
dramatic and widespread emerging markets crisis in 1998, when a general sell-off 
occurs first in Latin America and then spreads to other emerging markets. In particular, 
it affects Russia, whose banking system’s fragility allows for successful speculative 
attacks against the Ruble, by that way forcing the subsequent default (declared in 
August 1998), even if limited to the domestic debt. 
In this period, the estimated semi-annual risk-neutral default probabilities reach their 
peaks: 8.3% for Argentina, 14% for Brazil, 8.8% for Colombia, 16% for Ecuador, 6.1% 
for Mexico and 26.2% for Venezuela (the most dramatically hit country). 
Another financial crisis affects Latin America in December 1998 - February 1999, when 
the Real is devalued after speculative attacks based on the financial and fiscal fragility 
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of the Brazilian economy, and late in 1999, when Ecuador (whose implied default 
probability increases up to 45% in October) declares default. 
The motivations leading Turkey in the severe crisis dated spring 2001 are the critical 
situation of the financial sector, the high level of the inflation rate, the political 
uncertainty and the unmatched requests formulated by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund for critical but necessary reforms. 
Argentina’s troubles, instead, begin as an effect of the recession glooms involving the 
most important trading (and supporting) partner, the United States, as well as of the 
continuous political uncertainty concerning the government of the country itself. The 
bond markets, once again, call for higher risk premiums (and therefore higher implied 
default probabilities), starting from June 2001 and spreading from the domestic market 
to the Eurobonds and the Brady bonds markets. 
Looking at the interrelation between the default probabilities estimated for the different 
countries, we observe a high correlation across countries belonging to the same 
economic region. This is particularly true for the most economically homogeneous 
region in our sample, Latin America, with correlations around 70-80%. 
Applying a principal components analysis to the default probabilities estimated for the 
twelve countries in the sample, we can show that just two factors can explain almost 
70% of the total variability of default probabilities. 
As regards the distributional properties of implied risk-neutral default probabilities, in 
particular observing the distances of minimum and maximum values from the sample 
means and medians in table 2, we can see that the shape of such distributions looks far 
from being symmetric and is characterized by fat right tails. This intuition is reinforced 
                                                                                                                                               
4
 Although we do not include Ecuador among the twelve countries in our sample, we 
estimate default probabilities for this country (using the 11.25% Global bond expiring in 
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by the estimation of a non-parametric empirical probability density function of the 
estimates. A normal kernel is used to obtain the probability density functions (pdf’s) 
plotted in Figure 2. 
As stated in section 3, default probabilities are estimated assuming a fixed 20% recovery 
rate. However, by recalculating default probabilities under different recovery rates, we 
observe that changes in the recovery rate imply a parallel shift in the level of default 
probabilities, but do not modify their dynamics. This is important from our point of 
view, as the portfolio allocation problem which will be addressed in the next section is 
mainly concerned with the changes, rather than the levels, of default probabilities 5. 
Using the estimated default probabilities along with the fitted U.S. risk-free term 
structure, we can exploit equation (3) of the reduced-form model to recover, for each 
country, the implicit term structure of credit spreads, which reflects market’s medium-
long term expectations about bonds default probability. Table 3 contains some summary 
statistics on the whole sample. In general, we observe relatively flat term structures, 
which can become very steep during high volatility periods and downward sloping in 
the weeks following the end of a crisis. 
Using the estimated spread curves, we can test the hypothesis that default probabilities 
are negatively correlated with default-free interest rates. This evidence has generally 
been observed for corporate bonds (see, for example, Duffee (1999) and Duffie and 
Singleton (1999)), as default rates tend to be higher during recessions, when risk-free 
rates are relatively low. We observe that, for the twelve countries considered, the 
average correlation between the 1-year credit spread and the 1-year U.S. risk-free rate is 
                                                                                                                                               
April 2002) for the period preceding the 1999 default. 
5
 A different model, with simultaneous endogenous estimates of both the default 
probabilities and the recovery rates, would surely have been more appropriate if the 
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–0.31, with a peak for Turkey (–0.8) and no correlation for Russia and South Africa. 
Similar evidence holds for longer maturities. For example, at the 10-year maturity the 
average correlation is –0.33. 
 
6. Predicting the dynamics of default 
probabilities for portfolio trading strategies 
In the previous section, we have estimated historical default probabilities from market 
prices of emerging markets bonds. For the bonds we are considering, we can observe 
that to an increase (decrease) in default probability corresponds a decrease (increase) in 
the market price of the bond one week ahead, as the average correlation between lagged 
default probabilities and bond prices is –0.8. 
This means that predicting default probabilities, or, at least, the direction of default 
probabilities, can provide useful insights about future movements in bond prices. This 
would obviously represent relevant information for portfolio allocation. 
In this section, we develop a forecasting model for the probability of observing an 
increase/decrease in future default probabilities, which is based on the use of frequently 
observed financial variables. The forecasts are then used to implement efficient trading 
strategies for portfolios of emerging market bonds. 
Because of the availability of data on the explanatory variables, the analysis in the 
following is restricted to seven countries, which are representative of different economic 
regions: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, South Korea and Philippines. 
                                                                                                                                               
focus of our research had been just the estimation of the implied default probabilities, 
and not their use in the context of a trading portfolio strategy. 
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We first build a logit type model for the prediction of the probability of a market 
downgrading or upgrading of Global bonds. From now on, we use the term 
downgrading to indicate either an increase in bonds’ default probability or a decrease in 
bonds’ price. Similarly, we use the term upgrading to indicate a decrease in bonds’ 
default probability or an increase in bonds’ price. In fact, as said above, an increase 
(decrease) in default probability is almost equivalent to a decrease (increase) in the 
market price of the bond. 
The dependent variable in the logit model assumes either value 1 for positive weekly 
changes of the estimated default probability or value 0 for non-positive weekly changes. 
As explanatory variables, we use lagged values of some financial variables, such as 
short and long term interest rates in local currency, J.P.Morgan and Lehman Brothers 
local indexes, log changes in exchange rates and interest rate spreads with respect to 
U.S. rates. 
The model generally provides accurate predictions both for market downgrading and 
upgrading of bonds. Table 4 shows the percentage of correct in-sample predictions for 
one week ahead default probabilities and changes in bond prices. We notice that, with 
the only exception of South Korea, in about 75% of the cases the model correctly 
predicts future movements in default probabilities. As regards future changes in bond 
prices, the statistics are relatively satisfactory for all countries, except for South Korea 
and Russia (only in the downgrading case). 
The second step of our empirical investigation consists in using the logit specification to 
produce out-of-sample forecasts for the dynamics of default probabilities. In this case, 
we recursively estimate the model using windows of three years (Argentina, Mexico, 
Brazil) or one year (Russia, Turkey, Philippines, South Korea) of weekly data. 
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At each point in time, we generate one-step-ahead forecasts for the probability of having 
a bond market up/downgrading and use them to simulate trading strategies for portfolios 
of emerging market bonds. 
The simulations are carried out for the investment period 1 September 2000 – 27 July 
2001 (48 weeks) assuming a starting equally weighted portfolio of $1,000,000 Global 
bonds. 
Portfolios of different bonds are considered and the following naive trading strategy is 
applied 6: 
– upgrading signal (the probability of a decreasing default probability forecasted by the 
model is greater than 60%): position increased by $100,000 dollars; 
– downgrading signal (the probability of an increasing default probability forecasted by 
the model is greater than 60%): position closed; 
– no clear signal (the probability of a decreasing/increasing default probability 
forecasted by the model is between 40% and 60%): position unchanged; 
– minimum investment required to re-open a position on a bond: $100,000 dollars; 
– borrowing and lending at the USD risk-free 1 week Libor rate. 
We apply the strategy to 22 different portfolios: one containing all the bonds of the 
seven countries and 21 formed combining the seven bonds taking five at a time. 
Table 5 shows that the simple active portfolio strategy, which is based on the signals 
derived from the out-of-sample forecasts obtained by the logit model for the probability 
of an upgrading/downgrading of the bond over the next week, provides quite 
satisfactory results, especially in comparison with the buy & hold strategy and the 
                                                 
6
 This strategy has been implemented after several constructive discussions with 
numerous traders. 
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J.P.Morgan – Lehman Brothers benchmarks recalculated for the countries in the 
portfolios. 
In general, along the sample period considered in the simulations, emerging market 
bonds have not performed particularly well, as the average returns on the benchmarks 
and the buy & hold portfolios are negative: –1.7% and –9.4%, respectively. Instead, the 
active portfolio strategy always produces positive returns, with an average value around 
7.6%. Moreover, the variability of returns among the different portfolios is much lower 
(1.50%) than in the benchmarks (4.16%) and buy & hold (3.79%) case. 
In the calculations, we do not explicitly consider transaction costs. However, we believe 
that these returns are not over-estimated, especially if we take the point of view of a 
relatively large emerging market fund. In fact, we use the mean of bid and ask quotes for 
bond prices, which means that, on average, transaction costs are already included in the 
buying and selling prices used to implement the active strategy. Table 5 shows that 
when we explicitly introduce transaction costs we observe a decrease of almost 200 
basis points in the returns of the active portfolio strategy for a 10 basis points percentage 
of transaction costs. These are still relatively large returns for the active portfolio 
strategy with respect to the benchmark and the buy & hold strategy. 
The naive portfolio strategy based on the out-of-sample forecasts for default 
probabilities is also flexible enough to control for the risk of the portfolio. Figure 3 
shows that a VaR measure at the 95% confidence level, calculated using the J.P.Morgan 
RiskMetrics’s methodology, satisfies the capital requirements for the 7-bond portfolio 
formed applying the active strategy (this is true also for all the 5-bond portfolios). We 
observe that the active strategy provides a more suitable VaR measure than the buy & 
hold portfolio. In fact, it gives rise to only two breaks along the 48 weeks considered 
(4.2%), whereas there are five breaks (10.4%) in the case of the buy & hold strategy. 
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Moreover, as it adapts to new market conditions, the VaR measure in the active strategy 
case is less conservative and imposes, on average, lower capital requirements than in the 
buy & hold case. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have addressed two main issues: the computation of risk-neutral default 
probabilities implicit in emerging markets bond prices and the impact on portfolio risks 
and returns of expected changes in default probability. 
First, using a reduced-form model for the pricing of defaultable bonds, we have 
extracted the default probabilities from Global bond prices of twelve countries. The 
estimated default probabilities reflect quite closely actual crisis observed in the market 
over the sample period comprised between February 1997 and July 2001. 
Then, using logit type models, we have shown that weekly changes of the estimated 
probabilities could be predicted using a variety of capital markets factors (interest rates, 
exchange rates and credit spreads). 
Finally, we have used recursive estimates of a logit model to produce out-of-sample 
forecasts of the appreciation/depreciation of the Global bonds. 
The application of a naive portfolio strategy, based on the out-of-sample forecasts of the 
logit model for the probability of a weekly up/down movement in the market value of 
the bonds, has provided quite satisfactory results, both in terms of returns and in terms 
of portfolio risk management. This is particularly true when we compare them with 
those obtained by a buy & hold strategy and the J.P.Morgan – Lehman Brothers 
benchmarks recalculated for the countries in the portfolios. 
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Table 1 
Main features of Global bonds 
This table shows the main features of the U.S. Dollar denominated Global bonds 
included in the sample. The sample contains weekly market values of prices ranging 
from 14 February 1997 to 27 July 2001. All bonds pay the coupon semi-annually and 
are not collateralized. Bid-ask spreads are expressed as a percentage of the ask price. 
 
Issuer Maturity Coupon Bid-ask spreads 
   Mean St. Dev. 
Argentina 19 Sept. 2027 9.75 1.25 1.33 
Brazil 15 May 2027 10.125 1.25 1.71 
Colombia 15 Feb. 2027 8.375 1.86 1.60 
Mexico 15 May 2026 11.50 0.64 0.49 
Panama 30 Sept. 2027 8.875 1.16 0.69 
Venezuela 15 Sept. 2027 9.25 0.99 1.00 
Russia 24 July 2018 11.00 1.63 0.96 
South Africa 19 May 2009 9.125 0.91 0.29 
Turkey 15 June 2009 12.375 0.81 0.52 
China 22 Oct. 2027 7.30 1.09 0.29 
Philippines 15 Jan. 2019 9.875 1.37 0.88 
South Korea 15 Apr. 2008 8.875 0.62 0.32 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics on estimated default probabilities 
This table shows summary statistics on estimated default probabilities. These are weekly 
estimates from equation (2), where we consider long-term U.S. Dollar denominated 
Global bonds (see table 1) for a sample period ranging between 14 February 1997 and 
27 July 2001. USD Libor (all maturities between 1 month and 12 months) and swap 
rates (all maturities between 2 and 10 years and the 15, 20 and 30 years maturities) are 
used to fit the risk-free term structure in correspondence of the payments dates. The 
risk-free term structure of interest rates is obtained by fitting a cubic spline to these data. 
Values are expressed in percentage terms. 
 
Country No. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Max Min 
Argentina 203 3.54 3.34 1.13 9.42 2.04 
Brazil 217 4.35 3.73 2.05 15.18 2.24 
Colombia 233 2.88 2.95 1.20 8.40 0.88 
Mexico 233 2.04 1.98 0.84 5.74 0.70 
Panama 202 2.21 2.11 0.56 5.06 1.25 
Venezuela 203 5.64 4.43 4.53 45.13 2.03 
Russia 120 11.26 5.70 13.04 76.00 3.83 
South Africa 116 1.41 1.44 0.31 2.25 0.85 
Turkey 110 3.54 3.55 1.07 6.22 2.02 
China 197 1.13 1.07 0.40 2.39 0.27 
Philippines 134 2.90 2.85 0.81 4.67 1.51 
South Korea 173 1.31 0.79 1.20 6.71 0.35 
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Table 3 
Estimated term structures of credit spreads 
This table shows average estimated credit spreads for different maturities. These are 
implicitly derived from estimated default probabilities and U.S. risk-free term structure. 
The sample period varies for each country and ranges between 14 February 1997 and 27 
July 2001. Values are expressed in percentage terms. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
Country No. Obs. 1 year 5 years 10 years 
Argentina 203 3.09 3.05 2.98 
  (1.02) (0.98) (0.92) 
Brazil 217 3.85 3.76 3.64 
  (1.92) (1.79) (1.61) 
Colombia 233 2.51 2.48 2.43 
  (1.07) (1.04) (0.99) 
Mexico 233 1.76 1.75 1.73 
  (0.74) (0.72) (0.70) 
Panama 202 1.90 1.89 1.87 
  (0.49) (0.48) (0.46) 
Venezuela 203 5.20 4.87 4.50 
  (5.43) (3.75) (2.47) 
Russia 120 8.05 7.50 6.68 
  (5.99) (5.08) (3.80) 
South Africa 116 1.21 1.21 1.20 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
Turkey 110 3.09 3.06 2.99 
  (0.94) (0.92) (0.88) 
China 197 0.97 0.96 0.96 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Philippines 134 2.52 2.50 2.46 
  (0.72) (0.70) (0.68) 
South Korea 173 1.13 1.12 1.10 
  (1.06) (1.03) (1.00) 
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Table 4 
Percentage of correct in-sample predictions 
This table shows the percentage of correct in-sample predictions of a market 
downgrading (weekly increase in default probability or decrease in bond price) or 
upgrading (weekly decrease in default probability or increase in bond price) in the 
underlying bonds. These are obtained estimating a logit model, where the dependent 
variable assumes either value 1 for positive weekly changes of default probability or 
value 0 for non-positive weekly changes. As explanatory variables, short and long term 
interest rates in local currencies, J.P. Morgan and Lehman Brothers local indexes, log 
changes in exchange rates and interest rate spreads calculated with respect to U.S. rates 
are used. The sample period varies for each country and ranges between 14 February 
1997 and 27 July 2001. Values are expressed in percentage terms. 
 
  Change in default prob. Change in bond price 
Country No. Obs. Downgrading Upgrading Downgrading Upgrading 
Argentina 203 75 75 79 70 
Brazil 217 78 74 76 67 
Mexico 233 76 75 62 69 
Russia 120 80 80 53 75 
Turkey 110 78 79 67 71 
Philippines 134 77 72 70 65 
South Korea 173 61 79 58 56 
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Table 5 
Return on different investment strategies 
This table shows the returns given by different investment strategies on portfolios of 
Global bonds. Simulations are carried out for the period 1 September 2000 - 27 July 
2001 (48 weeks) assuming that the portfolios are initially equally weighted. An initial 
investment of $1,000,000 is assumed. On the active strategy, a minimum investment 
requirement of $100,000 is imposed to re-open a position. No constraints on 
borrowing/lending at the USD 1 week risk-free Libor rate are imposed. All values are in 
percentage terms. Bonds used to form portfolios are those of table 1 for Argentina (A), 
Brazil (B), South Korea (K), Mexico (M), Philippines (P), Russia (R) and Turkey (T). 
 
 
Portfolios 
Active portfolio 
No 
trans. costs 
Active portfolio 
10% b.p. 
trans. costs 
 
Benchmark 
 
Buy & hold 
A B K M P 4.58 2.80 0.24 – 9.45 
A B K M R 6.75 5.07 0.85 – 7.41 
A B K M T 7.98 6.00 – 6.37 – 13.73 
A B K P R 5.81 4.12 0.59 – 8.21 
A B K P T 7.05 5.05 – 6.61 – 14.53 
A B K R T 9.22 7.32 – 6.08 – 12.48 
A B P R T 8.29 6.28 – 6.77 – 14.34 
A B M P R 5.82 4.04 0.11 – 9.26 
A B M P T 7.05 4.97 – 7.05 – 15.58 
A B M R T 9.22 7.23 – 6.53 – 13.54 
A K M P R 6.73 5.11 3.22 – 5.19 
A K M P T 7.96 6.04 – 4.18 – 11.51 
A M P R T 9.20 7.28 – 4.32 – 11.32 
A K P R T 9.20 7.36 – 3.87 – 10.27 
A K M R T 10.13 8.31 – 3.61 – 9.47 
B K M P R 5.06 3.48 8.43 – 1.24 
B K M P T 6.29 4.41 0.64 – 7.56 
B M P R T 8.44 5.65 0.54 – 7.37 
B K P R T 7.53 5.73 1.00 – 6.32 
B K M R T 7.53 6.68 1.26 – 5.52 
K M P R T 8.46 6.72 3.58 – 3.30 
A B K M P R T 9.09 6.55 – 1.70 – 9.41 
Average 7.61 5.74 – 1.67 – 9.41 
Standard deviation 1.50 1.42 4.16 3.79 
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Figure 1 
Estimated default probabilities and sovereign spreads 
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Figure 2 
Non-parametric estimates of default probabilities pdf’s 
Argentina
Default Probability PDF
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Venezuela
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Turkey
Default Probability PDF
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Figure 3 
Value at Risk at the 95% confidence level for the 7-bond portfolio 
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